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Debt Relief and Debtor Outcomes: 
Measuring the Effects of Consumer 
Bankruptcy Protection 
Will Dobbie 
“The Bankruptcy Act is . . . of public as well as private 
interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor 
. . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future 
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of 
pre-existing debt.” (Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 
[1934])
 
In 2010, 1.5 million Americans filed for over $450 bil-
lion in debt relief through the consumer bankruptcy system. 
U.S. households receive more resources through the bank-
ruptcy system than through Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families and all state unemployment insurance programs 
combined (Lefgren, McIntyre, and Miller 2010), with nearly 
1 in 10 American households having filed for bankruptcy at 
some point (Stavins 2000). The U.S. bankruptcy system is 
also among the most generous in the world, allowing debtors 
to choose between Chapter 7, which provides debt relief and 
protection from wage garnishment in exchange for a debtor’s 
nonexempt assets, and Chapter 13, which adds the protection 
of most assets in exchange for a partial repayment of debt.
Despite providing billions in debt relief each year, it is not 
clear how bankruptcy protection impacts debtors. In theory, 
bankruptcy protection increases an individual’s incentive to 
work and prevents any sharp drops in consumption that may 
have important long-term consequences, such as becom-
ing sick through lack of medical care or losing one’s home 
through foreclosure. Yet, in practice, households work about 
the same number of hours (Han and Li 2007), accumulate 
less wealth (Han and Li 2011), and have less access to 
credit (Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump, and Montoriol-Garriga 
2009) after receiving bankruptcy protection, leading some to 
conclude that the benefits of debt relief have been overstated 
(Porter and Thorne 2006). The lack of demonstrable benefits, 
combined with a rapid increase in the number of bankruptcy 
filings, led Congress to enact new barriers to filing in the 
2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act. 
Empirically estimating the impact of bankruptcy protec-
tion has been complicated by two important issues. First, 
there is little information on the long-term outcomes of 
most bankruptcy filers. Bankruptcy filers are not tracked in 
a systematic way after filing, and data sets such as the PSID 
and NLSY include only a few hundred bankrupt households. 
Second, selection and endogeneity problems bias most 
comparisons. Bankruptcy filers are likely to have had worse 
outcomes even before filing, biasing cross-sectional compari-
sons, and most proximate causes of bankruptcy such as job 
loss and health shocks also impact later outcomes, biasing 
within-individual comparisons. 
In this dissertation, we use a new data set linking 500,000 
bankruptcy filings with administrative tax records from the 
Social Security Administration and administrative fore-
closure records to estimate the causal effect of Chapter 13 
bankruptcy protection on subsequent earnings, mortality, and 
home foreclosures. Our empirical strategy exploits the fact 
that most U.S. bankruptcy courts use a blind rotation system 
to assign cases to judges, effectively randomizing filers to 
judges within each court. Moreover, while there are uniform 
criteria by which a judge may dismiss a bankruptcy filing, 
there is significant variation in the interpretation of these 
criteria across judges (Chang and Schoar 2008; Norberg 
and Compo 2007; Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1994). 
As a result, otherwise identical filers are assigned to judges 
with substantially different rates of granting bankruptcy 
protection.1 
Using these differences in judge discharge rates as an 
instrumental variable for bankruptcy protection, we are able 
to identify the ex post impact of Chapter 13 on the marginal 
recipient of protection filers whose bankruptcy decisions 
are altered by the judge assignment due to disagreement on 
whether or not they should receive bankruptcy protection. 
The identified parameter holds fixed any ex ante impacts 
of bankruptcy, such as overborrowing, moral hazard in the 
workplace (White 2011), entrepreneurial risk-taking (Armour 
and Cumming 2008; Fan and White 2003), or the crowd-
ing out of formal insurance (Mahoney 2010). Our empirical 
strategy is therefore similar to Kling (2006), who uses the 
random assignment of judges to estimate the ex post impact 
of sentence length on earnings, and subsequent research esti-
mating the ex post effects of foster care (Doyle 2007, 2008), 
corporate bankruptcy (Chang and Schoar 2008), temporary-
help employment (Autor and Houseman 2010), and Disabil-
ity Insurance (French and Song 2011, Maestas, Mullen, and 
Strand forthcoming). 
We find compelling evidence that Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
protection benefits debtors. Over the first five postfiling 
years, Chapter 13 protection increases the marginal recipi-
ent’s annual earnings by $6,288, a 27.5 percent increase from 
the prefiling mean. Employment increases by 3.3 percent-
age points over the same time period, a 4.1 percent increase. 
Five-year mortality decreases by 1.1 percentage points, a 
27.5 percent decrease from the dismissed filer mean, and 
five-year home foreclosure rates decrease by 8.3 percentage 
points. 
Next, the dissertation explores two possible mechanisms 
through which bankruptcy protection may benefit debtors. 
First, we exploit within- and across-state variation in wage 
garnishment to assess the importance of the Chapter 13 pro-
vision protecting wages from garnishment. We find that the 
impact of Chapter 13 is sharply increasing in the marginal 
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garnishment rate, with an implied earnings elasticity with 
respect to garnishment of 2.02. These results are consistent 
with the idea that bankruptcy protection increases the incen-
tive to work by lowering the effective marginal tax rate on 
earnings. Second, we use information from firm EINs to esti-
mate the impact of Chapter 13 on economic stability. We find 
that the marginal recipient of Chapter 13 is 25.4 percentage 
points more likely to work in his or her prefiling job, 25.2 
percentage points more likely to work in the same industry, 
and 19.3 percentage points more likely to work in the same 
state, with larger impacts for filers facing higher marginal 
garnishment rates. These results suggest that Chapter 13 
increases economic stability by reducing both foreclosure-
related moves and moves meant to evade creditors seeking 
repayment.
The dissertation concludes by considering our results in 
light of a stylized general equilibrium model of the credit 
market. Analyses of the consumer bankruptcy system have 
typically focused on changes to consumption smooth-
ing and borrowing costs, largely ignoring the relationship 
between bankruptcy and earnings estimated in this paper 
(e.g., Athreya 2002; Chatterjee and Gordon forthcoming; Li 
and Sarte 2006; Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt 2007). As a 
result, the existing literature is likely to have understated the 
potential benefits of the consumer bankruptcy system. Using 
our reduced form estimates to calibrate a stylized extension 
of these models, we find that the benefits of bankruptcy are 
nearly 20 times larger when bankruptcy is allowed to impact 
earnings. 
Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States 
Bankruptcy is the legal process to resolve unpaid debts. In 
the United States, individual debtors are allowed to choose 
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. 
Under Chapter 7, debtors forfeit all nonexempt assets in 
exchange for a discharge of eligible debts and protection 
from future wage garnishment. Nearly all unsecured debts 
are eligible for discharge under Chapter 7, including credit 
card debt, installment loans, medical debt, unpaid rent and 
utility bills, tort judgments, and business debt. Student loans, 
child support obligations, and debts incurred by fraud cannot 
be discharged under Chapter 7, and secured debts such as 
mortgages, home equity loans, and automobile loans can 
only be discharged if debtors give up the collateral. 
Under Chapter 13, filers propose a 3–5-year plan to repay 
part of their unsecured debt in exchange for a discharge of 
the remaining unsecured debt, protection from future wage 
garnishment, and the protection of most assets. For example, 
Chapter 13 allows debtors to retain assets pledged as col-
lateral by including the collateral amount in the repayment 
plan. Chapter 13 also allows debtors to avoid home fore-
closure by including any mortgage arrears in the repayment 
plan, with the original mortgage reinstated after completion 
of the plan. Seventy percent of Chapter 13 filers report that 
avoiding foreclosure is their principal reason for choosing 
to file under Chapter 13 (Porter 2011), with 71 percent of 
filers including mortgage arrears in their repayment plans. 
In comparison, 41 percent of filers include car loans in their 
repayment plan, 38 percent include priority debt, and 0.5 per-
cent include student loans (White and Zhu 2010). 
Under either chapter, a randomly assigned bankruptcy 
judge decides any and all matters connected to a case, 
including whether or not to dismiss a filing. The most 
common reason a filing is dismissed is that it constitutes 
a “substantial abuse” of the bankruptcy process, typically 
meaning that a debtor being able to repay his or her debts 
without bankruptcy protection. Other common reasons for 
dismissal include a filing that is missing important informa-
tion, an infeasible repayment plan, or a repayment plan being 
too small (Hynes 2004). 
Creditors have a number of options to collect unpaid 
debts if a filing is dismissed, including collection letters or 
phone calls, in-person visits at home or work, or seizing 
assets through a court order (Dawsey, Hynes, and Ausubel 
2009). Creditors may also collect unpaid debts by obtaining 
a wage garnishment order from the state court. Federal law 
restricts the weekly total of most garnishments to 25 percent 
of disposable earnings. If debtors have weekly earnings less 
than 40 times the minimum wage, creditors may only garnish 
disposable earnings minus 30 times the federal minimum 
wage. Wages cannot be garnished when debtors earn less 
than 30 times the minimum wage. Debtors can make all of 
these collection efforts more difficult by ignoring collection 
letters and calls, changing their telephone numbers, or mov-
ing without leaving a forwarding address. Debtors can also 
leave the formal banking system to hide their assets from 
seizure, change jobs to force creditors to reinstate a garnish-
ment order, or work less so that their earnings are not subject 
to garnishment. 
Model and Research Design 
In this section, we develop a stylized bankruptcy and 
labor supply model to formalize our estimation strategy and 
identifying assumptions. We simplify the model by assum-
ing a single debt relief program and predetermined debt. 
Our model is therefore unable to shed light on any ex ante 
impacts of bankruptcy or the interplay between Chapter 7 
and Chapter 13. 
Setup. Individuals are endowed with identical debts D, 
and an idiosyncratic disutility of work θ that captures differ-
ences in ability across individuals. We assume that θ ~ [0, θ–], 
is known by the individual, but only partially observable to 
the bankruptcy court. 
In the first period of the model, individuals choose 
whether or not to file for bankruptcy protection at cost F that 
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includes all psychic or monetary costs of filing. Individuals 
pay F regardless of the bankruptcy decision, and before any 
labor supply decisions are made. Individuals receive a full 
discharge of debt if bankruptcy protection is granted, but 
must repay their debts out of wage earnings if bankruptcy is 
not granted. Conditional on filing, the probability of receiving 
bankruptcy protection is equal to p(θ). We assume that p(θ) 
is increasing in θ to capture the idea that bankruptcy judges 
dismiss filings from individuals who are able to repay their 
debts outside the bankruptcy system (e.g., filings that are a 
“substantial abuse” due to the filer’s low disutility of work).
In the second period, individuals do or do not receive 
bankruptcy protection. Individuals then choose whether 
to work at wage W, or to not work and receive C in social 
welfare. If individuals leave the labor market, they cannot be 
made to repay their debts. Dropping out of the labor market 
is therefore a different type of debt relief. We assume that 
wage earners pay a lump sum tax τ that finances debt relief 
and social welfare payments. 
An individual’s utility is equal to earnings minus the 
disutility of work θ, debt D, filing costs F, and taxes π. To 
simplify the model, we assume that all individuals prefer to 
work if they are given bankruptcy protection, and no one 
prefers to drop out of the labor force immediately over filing 
for debt relief. The first assumption holds if W − θ– − τ − F ≥ 
C. The second holds if p(θ) is concave and p(θ–) × (W – C − 
θ
–
 − τ) ≥ F. These conditions ensure that p(θ–) is sufficiently 
high and that the disutility of work θ– is sufficiently low that 
individuals with θ = θ– file for bankruptcy protection. 
Given these assumptions, there are three utility levels to 
consider: 1) UW (θ) = W − θ – D − τ for workers not receiv-
ing bankruptcy protection; 2) UWB(θ) = W − θ − τ for workers 
receiving bankruptcy protection; and 3) UN (θ) = C for indi-
viduals who are not working and not receiving bankruptcy 
protection. Given the utility functions of workers and non-
workers, we can analyze which individuals prefer working to 
not working if they do not receive bankruptcy protection and 
which individuals prefer filing for bankruptcy to not filing 
for bankruptcy. 
Figure 1 summarizes individuals’ labor supply and filing 
choices in our model, where p(θ) is the fraction of the popu-
lation with disutility of labor θ who would be granted bank-
ruptcy protection had they fled. Very productive individuals 
(θ < θF) work and never file for bankruptcy protection, as the 
expected benefit is too low to justify the fixed filing costs 
(p(θ) × D < F). Individuals who are slightly less productive 
file for debt relief, but will work regardless of the filing out-
come as UW (θW) ≥ UN by Proposition 1. In contrast, individu-
als with θ > θW will work only if they receive debt relief. 
Estimation. Our objective is to estimate the causal impact 
of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection B on outcomes Y: 
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 is the proportion of 
both affected and unaffected filers. The effect of bankruptcy 
protection is therefore increasing in the impact on the labor 
supply–affected filers and the fraction of affected filers in the 
filing population. 
The problem for inference is that OLS estimates of γ  
may be biased if bankruptcy protection is correlated with  
the unobservable determinants of later outcomes: 
E[θi|Bankruptcyi] ≠ 0. For example, bankruptcy filers are 
likely to have had worse outcomes even before filing, biasing 
cross-sectional comparisons. It is also likely that the most 
proximate causes of bankruptcy such as job loss and health 
shocks also impact later outcomes, biasing both cross- 
sectional and within-individual comparisons. 
We identify the causal impact of bankruptcy on debtors γ 
using judge leniency as an instrument for bankruptcy protec-
tion. To illustrate the intuition behind our approach, note that 
judges grant bankruptcy protection to filers who the judge 
believes will not repay their debts outside of bankruptcy: 
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Up to this point, we have assumed that 
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 is unbiased. 
We now relax this assumption by allowing each judge’s 
estimate of unobservable ability to be a function of indi-
vidual i’s true ability to repay, and characteristics of the 
judge assigned to the case, such as previous experience 
or personal biases:  where σj is the systematic component 
of judge j’s decision making that leads her to consistently 
over- or underestimate a filer’s disutility of labor, and ηij is 
noise in the decision-making process that is independently 
and identically distributed within and across judges.2 This 
implies that bankruptcy protection is granted if 
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Figure 1  Labor Supply and Bankruptcy Protection 
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Formally, we estimate the causal impact of receiving 
bankruptcy protection through a two-stage least squares 
regression using judge leniency as an instrumental variable 
for bankruptcy protection. The second-stage estimating equa-
tion is 
1)   yit = α +αct + ßXi + γBankruptcyi +εit 
where i denotes individuals; t is the year of observation; γ is 
the causal impact of bankruptcy protection defined above; 
αct are office by month-of-filing fixed effects; Xi includes 
race, gender, a quadratic in age, baseline employment, and 
baseline earnings, and εit is noise. The first stage estimating 
equation associated with Equation (1) is 
2)   Bankruptcyi = α +αct + ßXi + πσj + εi 
where π represents the impact of judge leniency on the prob-
ability of receiving bankruptcy protection. 
Formally, we define judge leniency Zicjt as the leave- 
one-out fraction of filings granted by judge j in year t minus 
the leave-one-out fraction granted in his court c in year t: 
3)
   
αct Xi
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where i again denotes individuals, c denotes courts, j is the 
assigned judge, t is the year of observation, Bi is an indica-
tor for receiving bankruptcy protection, ncjt is the number 
of cases seen by a judge in year t, and nct is the number of 
cases seen by a court in year t. This leave-one-out proce-
dure, essentially a reduced-form version of the Jackknife IV 
approach, purges the mechanical correlation between a filer’s 
own outcomes and our measure of judge leniency. 
Using our reduced form measure of judge leniency Zijct 
as an instrument for bankruptcy protection, the identified 
two-stage least squares parameter from equation measures 
the causal impact of Chapter 13 protection for the marginal 
recipient. Our estimates therefore measure the local aver-
age treatment effect for filers whose bankruptcy outcome is 
altered by judge assignment due to disagreement on whether 
they should receive bankruptcy protection. 
The three conditions necessary to interpret our two-stage 
least squares estimates as the causal impact of bankruptcy 
protection are 1) that judge assignment is associated with 
bankruptcy protection, 2) that judge assignment only impacts 
debtor outcomes through the probability of receiving bank-
ruptcy protection, and 3) that the impact of judge assign-
ment on the probability of receiving bankruptcy protection 
is monotonic across filers. In the dissertation, we show that 
each of these assumptions is likely to be satisfied. 
Main Results 
Labor Supply 
Panels A and B in Figure 2 present two-stage least squares 
results measuring the causal impact of Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy protection on earnings and employment. The sample 
consists of first time filers in the 31 courts that randomly 
assign filings to judges. We include filings originating 
between 1992 and 2005. We use our reduced form measure 
of judge leniency Zijct as an instrumental variable for bank-
ruptcy protection, and control for gender, race, a quartic in 
age, baseline employment, baseline earnings, and office by 
month-of-filing fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
the office level. 
Panel A in Figure 2 shows that Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
protection has a large and precisely estimated impact on 
postfiling earnings. Filers granted Chapter 13 protection from 
a more lenient judge have earnings that are $4,345 greater 
than those of dismissed filers in the first partial year after 
filing. In the first full year after filing, the marginal recipient 
of Chapter 13 earns $6,775 more than the marginal dismissed 
filer. Pooling outcomes across the first five full postfiling 
years, the marginal recipient of Chapter 13 has annual earn-
ings that are $6,288 higher, a 27.5 percent increase. 
We also present results for the sixth through tenth postfil-
ing years using filings originating between 1992 and 2000. 
In this sample, Chapter 13 protection increases the marginal 
recipient’s annual earnings by $6,619 in the sixth through 
tenth postfiling years. These results suggest that the impact 
of bankruptcy protection is persistent after the completion of 
the repayment plan. 
As an additional check of our identification strategy, Panel 
A in Figure 2 also plots two-stage least squares estimates for 
five prefiling years. Consistent with our identifying assump-
tions discussed above, there is no systematic relationship 
between bankruptcy protection and earnings in the prefiling 
years, with the estimated coefficients being economically and 
statistically insignificant. 
Panel B in Figure 2 presents results for employment, 
defined as nonzero earnings in a calendar year. Over the first 
five postfiling years, Chapter 13 increases employment by 
3.4 percentage points, a 4.1 percent increase from the base-
line mean. The probability of being employed is also higher 
in the sixth through tenth postfiling years, but the point 
estimates are too imprecisely estimated to draw definitive 
conclusions. 
Additional analyses show that Chapter 13 protection 
has a larger impact on filers with above median earnings, 
and filers who are between 25 and 60 years old at the time 
of filing. Chapter 13 increases annual earnings by $7,905 
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for filers with above median earnings, compared to only 
$3,859 for filers with below median earnings. The impact of 
Chapter 13 protection on employment is also 1.5 percentage 
points higher for filers with above median baseline earnings. 
Chapter 13 appears to have no impact on the earnings of fil-
ers older than 60, likely because these filers have already left 
the labor market. In contrast, Chapter 13 increases the annual 
earnings of filers who are between 25 and 40 years old by 
$8,639, and the annual earnings of filers who are between 
40 and 60 years old by $7,127. Bankruptcy protection also 
increases annual earnings somewhat more for filers who are 
female and nonwhite, though the differences are not econom-
ically or statistically significant. 
NOTE: These figures plot two-stage least squares results of the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on earnings, employment, 
cumulative mortality, and home foreclosure. The earnings and mortality sample includes all first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in 
courts that randomly assign cases to judges. The foreclosure sample includes the subset of those filings originating in county-by-year bins 
with foreclosure data coverage. We instrument for bankruptcy protection using judge leniency and control for gender, race, a quartic in age, 
baseline employment, baseline earnings, and office by month-of-filing fixed effects. The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals 
from standard errors clustered at the court level. Year 0 indicates the year a debtor files for bankruptcy protection. Earnings are winsorized 
at the top and bottom 1 percent. Employment is an indicator for nonzero wage earnings on the W-2. All monetary values are expressed in 
real 2000 dollars. Mortality is an indicator for being deceased in the indicated year using information from the Death Master File. Fore-
closure is an indicator for a filer’s home receiving a notice of default, receiving a notice of transfer or sale, or being transferred to a real 
estate owner or a guarantor. 
Figure 2  Impact of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Protection 
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Mortality 
Panel C in Figure 2 presents two-stage least squares 
results measuring the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy pro-
tection on mortality. Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection sig-
nificantly lowers mortality in the first five years after filing. 
Chapter 13 protection decreases one-year mortality for the 
marginal recipient by a statistically insignificant 0.3 percent-
age points, and two-year mortality by a statistically signifi-
cant 1.3 percentage points. Five-year mortality, the longest 
time period available for our entire sample, is 1.1 percentage 
points lower, a 27.5 percent decrease from the control mean 
of 4.0 percentage points. These estimates imply an increase 
of 0.04 in the number of years alive over the first five post-
filing years. In a sample of individuals filing between 1992 
and 2000, Chapter 13 protection decreases 10-year mortality 
by a statistically insignificant 2.1 percentage points.
To put the magnitude of these estimates in context, it is 
helpful to consider the effects of job loss the most commonly 
reported cause of bankruptcy on mortality. In a sample of 
Pennsylvania workers, Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) find 
that job displacement increases short-run mortality by 50 to 
100 percent, and long-run mortality by 10 to 15 percent. In 
the specification closest to ours, they find that job displace-
ment increases five-year mortality by 1.2 percentage points. 
One interpretation of our estimates is therefore that bank-
ruptcy protection can offset much of the increased mortality 
risk from financial distress caused by events such as job loss.
Home Foreclosure
Figure 2D presents two-stage least squares results measur-
ing the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on home 
foreclosure. The sample includes individuals filing in county-
by-year combinations in the DataQuick data described in the 
full dissertation.
Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection significantly lowers the 
probability of home foreclosure. In the raw data, five-year 
foreclosure rates are less than 0.5 percent for filers receiving 
bankruptcy protection, compared to 4.7 percent for dismissed 
filers. This implies that approximately one fifth of home own-
ers whose filings are dismissed experience home foreclosure 
within the first five postfiling years. In the two-stage least 
squares estimates, Chapter 13 decreases foreclosure by 4.2 
percentage points in the first postfiling year, and by 6.3 
percentage points in the second postfiling year. Foreclosure 
rates are 8.3 percentage points lower five years after filing, 
a 176 percent decrease from the dismissed filer mean. Note 
that the dismissed filer mean is not the counterfactual mean, 
so decreases of more than 100 percent are possible. Taken at 
face value, this pattern of results suggests that filers receiving 
bankruptcy protection were more likely to experience home 
foreclosure than dismissed filers, perhaps because bank-
ruptcy judges are more likely to grant bankruptcy to filers at 
particular risk of foreclosure. 
In additional results, we show that bankruptcy protection 
also significantly decreases voluntary and short home sales. 
Distress sales, which include both foreclosures and short 
sales, are 11.3 percentage points lower after five years. Home 
sales, which include all types of housing transactions, are 
16.2 percentage points lower after five years. 
Potential Channels 
Why are there such large benefits of receiving bankruptcy 
protection? In this section of the dissertation, we explore two 
potentially relevant explanations. First, we exploit within- 
and across-state variation in wage garnishment to assess the 
importance of the Chapter 13 provision protecting wages 
from garnishment. We find that the impact of Chapter 13 is 
sharply increasing in the marginal garnishment rate, with an 
implied earnings elasticity with respect to garnishment of 
2.02. These results are consistent with the idea that bank-
ruptcy protection increases the incentive to work by lowering 
the effective marginal tax rate on earnings. 
Second, we use information from firm EINs to estimate 
the impact of Chapter 13 on economic stability. We find that 
marginal recipient of Chapter 13 is 25.4 percentage points 
more likely to work in his or her prefiling job, 25.2 percent-
age points more likely to work in the same industry, and 19.3 
percentage points more likely to work in the same state, with 
larger impacts for filers facing higher marginal garnishment 
rates. These results suggest that Chapter 13 increases eco-
nomic stability by reducing both foreclosure-related moves 
and moves meant to evade creditors seeking repayment. 
Discussion 
The results we have presented have potentially important 
implications for the modeling of the consumer bankruptcy 
system. The evaluation of consumer bankruptcy laws has 
typically involved an assessment of two second-order effects, 
where bankruptcy benefits individuals by providing partial 
insurance against consumption uncertainty at the cost of 
higher interest rates that make life-cycle smoothing more 
difficult (e.g., Athreya 2002; Chatterjee and Gordon forth-
coming; Li and Sarte 2006; Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt 
2007). Importantly, the typical model does not account for 
the first order relationship between bankruptcy and labor sup-
ply estimated in this paper. As a result, the existing literature 
is likely to have understated the potential benefits of the 
consumer bankruptcy system. 
To see this, it is helpful to consider our earnings result 
in light of a stylized extension of the heterogeneous agent 
lifecycle model of Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007). 
We extend the Livshits, MacGee, andTertilt (2007) model 
2013 Dissertation Summaries 7
by assuming that default outside of the bankruptcy system 
lowers household productivity. This assumption is meant 
to capture in a transparent way the earnings loss observed 
among dismissed filers in our data. Holding all other param-
eters fixed, bankruptcy is over 10 times more beneficial when 
default lowers household productivity by 10 percent, and 
nearly 20 times more beneficial when default lowers house-
hold productivity by 25 percent. To put these magnitudes in 
perspective, the model suggests that bankruptcy is six times 
more beneficial when the frequency of expense shocks is 
doubled, and nearly 40 times more beneficial when the size 
of expense shocks is doubled (Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt 
2007).
The results of this stylized exercise suggest that individual 
debt relief is likely to be welfare-improving. This conclusion 
differs substantially from a number of prominent papers, 
such as Athreya (2002) and Chatterjee and Gordon (forth-
coming), that abstract away from the effects of bankruptcy 
on earnings. Even models that suggest debt relief is welfare-
improving, such as Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), 
likely understate the benefits of the consumer bankruptcy 
system by assuming little to no impact of bankruptcy on 
labor supply. Incorporating our health and home foreclosure 
results into the model would only further strengthen this 
conclusion. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimate the impact of Chapter 13 
bankruptcy protection on subsequent labor supply, mortality, 
and home foreclosure. We find that Chapter 13 increases the 
marginal recipient’s annual earnings in the first five postfil-
ing years by $6,288, a 27.5 percent increase. Employment 
increases by 3.3 percentage points over the same time period, 
a 4.1 percent increase. Five-year mortality is 1.1 percentage 
points lower, a 27.5 percent decrease, with five-year foreclo-
sure rates falling by 8.3 percentage points. There is evidence 
consistent with the results being driven by increased incen-
tive to work and increased economic stability following the 
receipt of bankruptcy protection. 
Our results provide new evidence on the ex post ben-
efits of debt relief. These results are particularly important 
in light of the on-going debate surrounding the use of debt 
relief and mortgage modification to stimulate the economy. 
Work by Mulligan (2008), Hall (2011), and Eggertsson and 
Krugman (forthcoming) suggests that household borrowing 
constraints can help explain the severity of the recession, 
while Mian and Sufi (2012) show that regional differences 
in debt overhang can explain differences in unemployment. 
Our estimates also suggest that the restrictions on bankruptcy 
filing introduced by the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act may have important adverse 
consequences on the economy. 
The main limitation of our analysis is that we are not able 
to estimate the impact of bankruptcy laws on ex ante borrow-
ing costs or behavior. There may also be important ex post 
impacts of bankruptcy protection on outcomes such as credit 
availability that we are unable to measure with our data. 
Finally, our analysis has focused on Chapter 13 bankruptcy, 
which makes up about 30 percent of all bankruptcy filings. 
This paper should therefore be viewed as a first step toward 
characterizing the impact of consumer bankruptcy protection 
on debtors. 
Notes
1.  We are unable to estimate the impact of Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
protection using judge assignment, as there is relatively little 
variation in the treatment of Chapter 7 cases. We use an event 
study design to show that filers granted protection under Chap-
ter 7 earn $1,048 more each year, are 6.3 percentage points 
more likely to be employed, and are 1.45 percentage points less 
likely to be deceased after five years. 
2.  The decision problem can also be expressed as one in which 
estimates of θ are unbiased, but judges use different cutoff 
values  ^θ jB due to pro-creditor or pro-debtor preferences. In this 
scenario, judge j grants a filing if  ^θi + ηij >  
^
θB + σj, where σj 
represents judge-specific differences in the optimal cutoff. 
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